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AbsTrACT
background Large epidemics frequently emerge in 
conflict-affected states. We examined the cholera response 
during the humanitarian crisis in Yemen to inform control 
strategies.
Methods We conducted interviews with practitioners and 
advisors on preparedness; surveillance; laboratory; case 
management; malnutrition; water, sanitation and hygiene 
(WASH); vaccination; coordination and insecurity. We 
undertook a literature review of global and Yemen-specific 
cholera guidance, examined surveillance data from the 
first and second waves (28 September 2016–12 March 
2018) and reviewed reports on airstrikes on water systems 
and health facilities (April 2015–December 2017). We used 
the Global Task Force on Cholera Control’s framework to 
examine intervention strategies and thematic analysis to 
understand decision making.
results Yemen is water scarce, and repeated airstrikes 
damaged water systems, risking widespread infection. 
Since a cholera preparedness and response plan was 
absent, on detection, the humanitarian cluster system 
rapidly developed response plans. The initial plans did not 
prioritise key actions including community-directed WASH 
to reduce transmission, epidemiological analysis and 
laboratory monitoring. Coordination was not harmonised 
across the crisis-focused clusters and epidemic-focused 
incident management system. The health strategy was 
crisis focused and was centralised on functional health 
facilities, underemphasising less accessible areas. As 
vaccination was not incorporated into preparedness, 
consensus on its use remained slow. At the second wave 
peak, key actions including data management, community-
directed WASH and oral rehydration and vaccination were 
scaled-up.
Conclusion Despite endemicity and conflict, Yemen 
was not prepared for the epidemic. To contain outbreaks, 
conflict-affected states, humanitarian agencies, and donors 
must emphasise preparedness planning and community-
directed responses.
InTroduCTIon
Cholera outbreaks remain a marker for the 
world’s most marginalised communities. 
In 2017, the Global Task Force on Cholera 
Control (GTFCC) launched Ending Cholera: 
A Global Roadmap to 2030.1 It proposes to 
strengthen health systems, water, sanitation 
and hygiene (WASH) and coordination strat-
egies for cholera control in low-income and 
Key questions
What is already known?
 ► In the last decade, large-scale cholera epidem-
ics have occurred in countries affected by conflict, 
political instability and/or population displacement 
including Iraq, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, 
Tanzania and Zimbabwe.
 ► While a multisector response (including coordination; 
case management; water, sanitation and hygiene; 
social mobilisation; and oral cholera vaccination) is 
well-defined in practice, the major barrier in fragile 
and conflict-affected states is the coordinated de-
livery of interventions in difficult logistical contexts.
What are the new findings?
 ► Our analysis of the 2016–2018 cholera response in 
Yemen outlined five major challenges for the control 
of large epidemics in fragile and conflict-affected 
states and for global health security.
 ► Major challenges included: (1) assuring sufficient 
cholera preparedness and planning, (2) increasing 
the capacity of surveillance and data management 
for epidemic monitoring, (3) decentralising and tar-
geting cholera-specific water, sanitation and hygiene 
and case management strategies, (4) harmonising 
epidemic and humanitarian coordination systems 
and (5) protecting water systems and health facili-
ties during conflict.
What do the new findings imply?
 ► Our case study starkly highlights the importance of 
disease risk assessment, preparedness planning 
and coherent early strategies for cholera control in 
conflict-affected states.
 ► Preparedness and response strategies in crises 
should prioritise the capacity to direct responses 
close to cholera-affected communities through ex-
isting networks (eg, community health workers and 
district-level resources) and provide the necessary 
supplementary resources (eg, rapid response teams) 
early in the response in order to reduce transmission.
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box 1 Global Task Force on Cholera Control (GTFCC) 
framework for cholera control1
Early detection and quick response to contain outbreaks at an early 
stage, including early warning surveillance systems, prepositioning 
stocks, preparedness of water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) 
systems, preparedness of the health care system and improved 
health care facility infrastructure, establishment of WASH and health 
rapid response teams, maintenance of stocks of WASH supplies, 
specific WASH interventions to prevent spread of disease, community 
engagement, mass vaccination campaigns with oral cholera 
vaccination (OCV) and effective supply management;
A multisectoral approach to prevent cholera in hotspots in endemic 
countries, including identification of hotspots requiring priority action, 
analysis of local transmission patterns and implementation of a 
package of control measures adapted to local transmission patterns;
An effective mechanism of coordination for technical support, 
resource mobilisation and partnership at the local and global level.
middle-income countries. By 2030, the GTFCC aims to 
reduce cholera mortality by 90% and eliminate cholera 
in 20 of the 47 cholera-affected countries. Fragile 
and conflict-affected states (FCAS) where large and 
prolonged cholera epidemics have occurred, including 
Iraq, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and 
South Sudan, are critical to achieving these goals.2 Oper-
ational constraints on logistics, security and the coordina-
tion of humanitarian partners in FCAS reduce access to 
communities and challenge epidemic control.3 4
Since 2016, Yemen has experienced a large-scale 
cholera epidemic overlaid on civil war and a humani-
tarian crisis. In 2015, the United Nation’s (UN) decla-
ration of a level 3 (L3) emergency activated the highest 
level of resource mobilisation across the humanitarian 
system. Before cholera emerged, 46% of 3507 health facil-
ities were operational, blockades of sea ports prevented 
the entry of essential goods and medicines and severe 
insecurity restricted the movement of civilians, the UN 
and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).5 6 By 2017, 
food insecurity had placed 60% of the population at risk 
of famine.5
More than 1 million suspected cases of cholera were 
reported from 28 September 2016 to 2 July 2018.7 In 
this case study, we identified lessons from the cholera 
response during the first and second waves of the 
epidemic to better prepare Yemen and other FCAS for 
cholera response during humanitarian crises.
MeTHods
This study used an explanatory case study design to 
analyse decision making and intervention strategies 
during the first and second waves.8 Literature reviews, key 
informant interviews (KII) and interpretation of surveil-
lance and airstrike data were employed. The GTFCC’s 
framework for cholera control was used to guide the anal-
ysis (Box 1).1
Literature reviews
A literature review of global cholera and epidemic guid-
ance for FCAS was conducted to describe control strate-
gies adapted for FCAS. This included a PubMed search 
during February 2018 using the search terms ‘cholera’ 
(title) AND (‘epidemic’ OR ‘control’, ‘prevention’ or 
‘strategy’) AND the names of FCAS derived from the 
World Bank’s harmonised lists of fragile situations.9 
Relevant websites (eg, GTFCC, WHO, UNICEF, Global 
Clusters and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) were also 
searched using this approach. A second literature review 
of Yemen-specific documents, including cholera prepar-
edness and response plans, epidemiological reports, eval-
uations and news articles concluded in November 2018. 
The terms ‘Yemen’ AND ‘cholera’ were used to search 
the WHO, UNICEF, Global Clusters, Humanitarian 
Response, Devex and The New Humanitarian (formerly 
IRIN) websites, and documents were requested from KII 
respondents. One author screened the documents for 
relevance.
Interpretation of surveillance and airstrike data
Epidemic curves and key indicators (eg, attack rate, 
case fatality ratio (CFR) and proportion of cases under 
5 years) from a comprehensive analysis of the first wave 
(28 September 2016–23 April 2017) and second wave 
(24 April 2017–2 July 2017) surveillance data were 
reviewed.7 To investigate the frequency of airstrikes on 
water systems and health facilities, data on the time and 
location of airstrikes from April 2015 to December 2017 
were compiled from the Yemen Data Project, an inde-
pendent database of cross-referenced, open-source data 
on air raids.10
Key informant interviews
KIIs were used to explain how decisions were made, how 
actions were implemented and personal perspectives. 
They were conducted with national and international 
practitioners, advisors, donors and government officials.
Potential respondents were identified through a stake-
holder analysis.11 Semistructured interview guides were 
prepared by thematic area (preparedness and coordi-
nation, surveillance and laboratory, case management, 
nutrition, WASH, oral cholera vaccination (OCV) and 
insecurity). Potential respondents were contacted by 
email with study information, and their confidential 
participation was requested. KIIs were undertaken by 
a thematic lead by telephone/Skype or in-person and 
lasted 30–75 min. To improve note-taking accuracy, most 
KIIs involved two investigators. Detailed interview notes 
were kept, and some were recorded (with permission). 
Informed consent was documented.
Within each sector, a thematic analysis was undertaken 
and triangulated with the literature review and surveil-
lance data.12 Monthly team debrief meetings were under-
taken by telephone/Skype or in-person to build a broad 
interpretation across sectors and to generate new ques-
tions. Member checking was conducted by sharing draft 
M
edicine. Protected by copyright.
 o
n
 13 August 2019 at London School of Hygiene and Tropical
http://gh.bmj.com/
BM
J G
lob Health: first published as 10.1136/bmjgh-2019-001709 on 15 July 2019. Downloaded from 
Spiegel P, et al. BMJ Global Health 2019;4:e001709. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2019-001709 3
BMJ Global Health
box 2. Key informant interviews: organisations 
(*includes at least one respondent who worked in Yemen)
1. Action Contre la Faim.*
2. Canadian Red Cross.*
3. CARE.*
4. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
5. Center for Civilians in Conflict.*
6. WASH cluster.*
7. Department for International Development.
8. European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations.*
9. Epicentre.*
10. General Authority for Rural Water Supply Projects.*
11. Health cluster.*
12. Human Rights Watch: Middle East office.
13. International Committee of the Red Cross.
14. International Medical Corps.*
15. International Rescue Committee.*
16. Médecins Sans Frontières – Holland.*
17. Médecins Sans Frontières – Spain.*
18. Nutrition cluster.*
19. The Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance.
20. OXFAM.*
21. Relief International.*
22. Save the Children.*
23. SOUL for Development.*
24. UNICEF*: Public Health Emergencies Team, WASH Team, Health 
Team, Nutrition Team, Middle East and North Africa Regional Office 
and Yemen Country Office.*
25. United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator.*
26. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
27. World Bank.
28. WHO*: Emergency Operations Team, Cholera Team, EOC 
Operations Team, Emergency Risk Management and Humanitarian 
Response Team, Eastern Mediterranean Regional Office, Yemen 
Country Office.*
box 3. Quotes from respondents
surveillance
Quote 1: ‘[We realized that] it’s not just where we are [in Aden], it’s 
everywhere, and it’s intense everywhere’. (Field epidemiologist, onset 
of second wave)
 
Quote 2: ‘We were seeing hundreds of cases a day. Within a week, 
it was 3,000 cases a day. Nobody could respond at this level’. (Senior 
manager, onset of second wave)
 
Preparedness and funding
Quote 3: ‘The small [first] wave should have put in place alerts, and 
people to answer to the 2nd wave. We need to analyze why the 2nd 
wave was so big, even with rainy season (it’s a factor), but why was it 
so massive’. (Epidemiologist, first wave)
 
Quote 4: ‘The World Bank made an investment for future, for when 
they can get back in-country. They showed they were willing to take a 
gamble. You’ll see them in more places with de facto governments to 
build an operational footprint’. (Senior UN official, second wave)
Water, sanitation and hygiene
Quote 5: ‘The overall struggle we’ve had with the cholera response is 
that, when the initial reprogramming came in in 2016, it didn’t look 
like a cholera response. It looked like a WASH IDP [internally displaced 
persons] response’. (Anonymous, first wave)
 
Quote 6: ‘It took a year and a half and well into the second phase 
of the outbreak before the kind of specific cholera interventions 
that are related to WASH actually kind of started and got rolled out’. 
(Anonymous, second wave)
 
Quote 7: ‘I haven’t been allowed by the authorities to be able to 
access the field where our teams are working … I’ve only had very 
limited success in seeing beyond the office’. (Anonymous, second 
wave)
Case management
Quote 8: ‘Some districts were completely ignored. We only addressed 
1st level catchment populations and there are villages where we 
simply do not know what happened. [They are] very hard to reach’. 
(Health coordinator, second wave)
 
Quote 9: ‘The response from the big players has been to build 
up treatment capacity, and neglect community-based efforts. This 
is of limited value in addressing the outbreak at the source’. (Health 
coordinator, second wave)
oral cholera vaccination
Quote 10: ‘South Sudan, Somalia and Yemen [are similar cases]. 
Each country has cholera preparedness plan. We should have revised 
[it] and included OCV. We only wake up when there is a cholera 
outbreak… we always try to introduce it once the outbreak starts’. 
(Anonymous, second wave)
Coordination
Quote 11: ‘In Yemen, we can’t simply turn the ship around. A child dies 
of malnutrition and [another] child dies of cholera. But they are both 
dying. What’s an appropriate way to get the funds we need and make 
it available [for both malnutrition and cholera control]?’ (Donor, second 
wave)
reports confidentially with selected respondents, and the 
final draft was shared with WHO and UNICEF in Yemen, 
followed by a teleconference. All suggested changes were 
discussed by the study team and updated, as deemed 
appropriate.
Patient and public involvement
There was no patient or public involvement in the devel-
opment or execution of this research study.
resuLTs
The results are summarised by sector. Fifty-eight docu-
ments were reviewed and 71 of the 80 potential KIIs were 
conducted. Respondents were from national and inter-
national NGOs, UN agencies and government ministries 
(Box 2). Most respondents (75%) had worked in Yemen. 
Selected quotes are provided in Box 3 to emphasise the 
themes derived from multiple KII interviews.
surveillance
The first wave disseminated cholera in the south before 
an explosive surge in the second wave across the south, 
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centre and north.7 Lasting 7 months, the first wave 
peaked at 2000 suspected cases weekly in December 2016 
and 1663 deaths in total.10 The second wave included 
a rapidly increasing trend and expanding geography 
over 2 months, and a gradually decreasing trend over 8 
months, with a massive peak of 50 832 weekly suspected 
cases in June 2017 and 2265 deaths in total (box 3, 
quotes 1–2).7 The increasing phase occurred at the onset 
of the rainy season and was potentially associated with a 
shift from household use of deep well water to contam-
inated surface water.7 This phase typifies the character-
istics of cholera transmission including a sharp ascent, 
synchronous bursts across Western Yemen, a large peak, 
high cumulative attack rates comparable with standards 
(0.1%–2% in large-scale outbreaks), a small proportion 
of children under 5 years (18.3%), a large proportion 
of severe cases (30.6%) and a high CFR (>1% at the 
start, decreasing to <1% with treatment scale-up).13 In 
contrast, the first wave and the decreasing phase of the 
second wave demonstrate long tails, a large proportion 
of children under 5 years (≥30%) and a low propor-
tion of severe cases.7 This suggests the over-reporting of 
endemic diarrhoea of other origin and the underestima-
tion of the CFR.
Over-reporting appeared substantial, even considering 
the high sensitivity of the globally accepted suspected 
cholera case definition.14 There were several driving 
factors. The disruption in health systems meant that 
non-cholera patients routinely presented to diarrhoea 
treatment centres (DTCs) for care. Persisting into the 
second wave, standard methods for case ascertainment 
and reporting were not well reinforced in some DTCs.15 
Health workers were also unpaid since 2016, giving rise 
to rumours that reduced reporting would lead to the 
cessation of DTCs and their incentive payments.16
Additionally, the national surveillance system for the 
early warning of outbreaks had existed since 2013 but was 
not optimised for the management of a large epidemic. 
The electronic Disease Early Warning System (eDEWS) 
included a 400-site sentinel network that used mobile 
phones to report on 31 conditions.17 18 To respond to 
cholera in the first wave, eDEWS rapidly expanded to 
1982 sites nationally.18 However, the structure could not 
support data management needs of the rising cholera 
caseload. Line-lists from DTCs were instead emailed daily 
to the Ministry of Public Health and Population (MoPHP), 
incurring delays in processing and sharing with partners. 
During the second wave peak, as thousands of cases were 
reported daily, another system (EWARS-in-a-Box) was 
scaled to improve data management and reporting. It 
could not however quickly address the mass training and 
supervision required to improve poor adherence to the 
suspected case definition. Laboratory culture relied on 
only two central laboratories in Sana’a and Hodeidah, and 
this low capacity could not reliably monitor geographical 
shifts in cholera. Protocols for rapid diagnostic testing 
(RDT) of every 10th suspected case in DTCs were set, but 
RDTs were not widely available.19
Epidemiological investigations of hotspots, transmis-
sion and high-risk groups were not routinely undertaken, 
and there was no community surveillance to detect 
cases and deaths outside of DTCs. With limitations in 
data quality and availability, detailed interpretation of 
surveillance and laboratory data was absent from cholera 
response plans.
Preparedness and funding
Yemen’s health services were primarily organised through 
the UN’s Humanitarian Response Plan. Two small cholera 
outbreaks and a large outbreak of 30 000 suspected cases 
were reported between 2009 and 2011.20 The WHO’s 
Regional Office established a regional framework for 
cholera control in 2014.21 By 2015, Yemen’s water and 
sanitation infrastructure was degraded, and 50% of the 
population required WASH assistance.22 Despite these 
risk factors, Yemen did not have a cholera preparedness 
and response plan in place prior to the 2016 outbreak.
On detection of cholera in Sana’a in September 2016, 
the health and WASH clusters and the MoPHP rapidly 
developed the first wave’s cholera preparedness and 
response plan that same week. The plan emphasised 
preventative WASH approaches and case management 
in governorates where cholera had been confirmed or 
was likely to emerge, instead of geographically targeted 
approaches to interrupt transmission.23 It did not include 
key standard components, including analysis of hotspots, 
scenarios for OCV use, community surveillance, infec-
tion prevention and control and improvement of labo-
ratory capacity. The lack of detailed planning meant that 
the initial response prioritised logistical issues such as the 
procurement of rehydration supplies and reinforcement 
of existing WASH strategies over a multisector and chol-
era-specific strategy. A response-wide after-action review 
of the first wave was not conducted despite the risk of 
resurgence (box 3, quote 3). Following the emergence 
of a second wave, the response plans were updated to 
include targeted approaches in 286 (of 331) districts and 
prevention in 47 districts.19 However, the plan was issued 
late after the second wave peak.
WHO and the Health Pooled Fund provided major 
funding during the first wave. Following an appeal 
during the second wave where only 47 million of 250 
million requested was received, there was an initial short-
fall, which required the diversion of food security and 
malnutrition funding to address cholera.24 The World 
Bank began to disburse funding (of 483 million total) 
early in the second wave through a recommitment of 
International Development Association grants that were 
previously cancelled due to the crisis. This allowed for 
the preservation of primary health and nutrition services, 
with sufficient flexibility to use funds for cholera control 
(box 3, quote 4). Respondents did not cite funding across 
the entire cholera response as a major challenge. This 
compares with annual appeals that are historically under-
funded; for example, in 2016, only 47% of the Humani-
tarian Response Plan was funded.25 26
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Water, sanitation and hygiene
Yemen is extremely water scarce, placing nearly the 
entire population vulnerable to the economic and 
physical impacts of water scarcity and health impacts of 
water-washed and water-borne diseases. When the first 
wave occurred, NGOs maintained non-specific WASH 
activities to improve water supply, sanitation, hygiene 
and solid waste management with few cholera-specific 
WASH activities (eg, disinfection of water and surfaces in 
patient homes and DTCs). However, these programmes 
remained community based and small scale, relative to 
the expanding epidemic. The 2016 cholera preparedness 
and response plan reinforced these blanket activities over 
interventions targeting cholera-affected households and 
communities (box 3, quote 5).
This approach continued during the second wave 
wherein the WASH cluster found that most beneficiaries 
were reached through support to urban areas including 
the rehabilitation of water infrastructure and mainte-
nance of sewage treatment plants.27 Insecurity impacted 
the capacity of NGOs to carry out targeted programming. 
By the second wave, UNICEF, as the provider of last resort 
and the WASH cluster lead, took a major role in imple-
mentation. Due to the humanitarian roster system, it was 
not until the second wave peak that UNICEF and WHO 
were able to send cholera specialists to develop a chol-
era-specific WASH strategy. This new strategy focused on 
chlorination at all points in the water chain to reduce 
transmission in hotspots and scale-up of rapid response 
teams (RRTs) at the district level to target cholera-affected 
households and attempt to prevent intrahousehold and 
community transmission. Implemented through govern-
ment staff, the RRT strategy achieved community access 
and scale but was implemented too late after the second 
wave peak to address containment (box 3, quote 6).
Insecurity restricted hygiene promotion activities (box 
3, quote 7). UNICEF and WHO carried out a national 
household awareness campaign with 40 000 volun-
teers disseminating cholera awareness messages across 
14 million households in all governorates during the 
second wave peak. While lauded by respondents, they 
expressed the need for earlier implementation during 
the increasing phase of the second wave.
Monitoring of the WASH strategy using free residual 
chlorine (FRC) as the primary outcome indicator was 
recommended by the WASH cluster. While 16 of the 25 
WASH cluster partners reported routinely implementing 
postdistribution monitoring and FRC testing, FRC data 
were not easily accessible to inform programming.27
Case management
The treatment network of DTCs and oral rehydra-
tion corners (ORCs) was insufficiently decentralised 
throughout the epidemic to ensure adequate access 
for a large proportion of the population living in hard-
to-reach, mountainous and insecure areas. The 2016 
cholera preparedness and response plan focused on 
establishing DTCs in or near existing health facilities and 
schools instead of placement driven by epidemiological 
need in less accessible areas (box 3, quote 8).23 Decision 
making was driven by the humanitarian need to integrate 
all health services in a single complex due to the lack of 
clinicians and functioning health facilities, rather than 
the isolation of cholera patients to prevent secondary 
transmission. Health facilities and schools were not ideal 
as DTCs as they displaced services and disrupted infec-
tion control. It is unclear how non-cholera patients who 
presented to DTCs were accommodated, given the lack of 
practical referral options. NGO partners interviewed had 
few or no health staff directly supervising ORC/DTCs, so 
monitoring the quality of case management could not be 
done systematically.
Particularly in rural contexts with poor access to care, 
ORCs should be the first point of care for patients to 
provide prompt access to care for the 80% who require 
only rehydration.13 However, ORCs were only established 
during the second wave. Their placement did not address 
the epidemiological picture and volume for widespread 
access in communities. Neither Yemen’s networks of 
community health workers nor Red Crescent volunteers 
were mobilised to staff ORCs in remote areas. Only 32.4% 
of suspect cholera cases in Yemen visited a DTC on the 
same day of symptom onset, while for 10.2% of patients 
it took two or more days to access care.7 This meant 
that patients were not able to routinely access an ORC 
within 1 hour of walking, which is a GTFCC standard.28 
The health response was cited as ‘unable to address the 
outbreak at the source (the community)’ (box 3, quote 
9).
In large epidemics, high-risk groups including preg-
nant women and children with severe acute malnutrition 
(SAM) require case management protocols.29 Protocols 
were either lacking or insufficiently practical, reflecting 
the lack of clarity from global bodies. Protocols for SAM 
were not published until after the start of the second 
wave, and none were available for pregnant women.
oral cholera vaccination
The use of OCV was slowed by the lack of a cholera 
preparedness and response plan and hence less famil-
iarity with OCV among the MoPHP and partners. This 
scenario is similar to other conflict-affected countries 
that lack experience in implementing OCV.30 The first 
wave response lacked a robust discussion about carrying 
out an epidemiological risk assessment for OCV, despite 
being raised by advisors (box 3, quote 10). This is notable 
given recent evidence demonstrating the added value of 
using OCV in crises where WASH improvements are slow 
to achieve.31
WHO drove efforts to strategically use vaccination to 
interrupt spread early during the second wave. The risk 
assessment was challenging due to the lack of accurate 
data to guide vaccination strategies. Following this first 
risk assessment, the MoPHP requested nearly all of the 
3.4 million doses from the global stockpile and the Inter-
national Coordinating Group (ICG). Some partners 
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and decision makers considered the plan too ambitious 
given Yemen’s lack of OCV implementation experience 
and its reduced operational capacity. Eventually, the ICG 
approved the request, beginning with an initial tranche 
of 500 000 doses, though the MoPHP then cancelled this 
request.32 Potential reasons for this stasis included polit-
ical concerns about covering an adequate proportion of 
the population in government and opposition-controlled 
areas, the lack of rigorous data for targeting high-risk 
communities, the poor operational context and a lack of 
participation of partners in risk assessment.
Following a second risk assessment in January 2018, 
the focus shifted toward boosting prevention efforts for 
an anticipated surge of cholera during the rainy season 
(April–August 2018). Based on the risk assessment, the 
March 2018 cholera preparedness and response plan 
included a vaccination strategy, and the MoPHP made 
a successful request for 4.6 million doses for preventa-
tive use.19 Yemen’s campaign took advantage of innova-
tions for delivering OCV in crises including using the 
far-reaching poliomyelitis infrastructure to deliver the 
vaccine across age groups and a single-dose strategy to 
enable short-term protection.31
Some respondents considered that preparedness for 
the 2018 rainy season should have been the focus across 
all sectors and agencies, with OCV playing a major role 
within that discussion. Instead, discussions on OCV were 
prolonged, and key elements including prepositioning 
of supplies may have been delayed or insufficiently 
considered.
Coordination
Yemen’s need for strong coordination remained para-
mount given the complexity of the cluster system 
managing both the humanitarian crisis and cholera 
epidemic and simultaneously addressing two warring 
government factions (box 3, quote 11). Three coordi-
nation systems operated with various success and limited 
complementarity. This included the: (1) health and 
WASH clusters, (2) cholera task force and (3) incident 
management system (IMS) and its emergency opera-
tions centres (EOCs). The cluster approach showed 
agility in developing the initial response by its lever-
aging of relationships with governments and through its 
understanding of the operational environment and the 
geographical distribution of partners. However, the dual 
workload of developing the response plan and managing 
the crisis was excessive. Experienced cholera specialists 
could not arrive until the height of the second wave due 
to the heavily restrictive humanitarian roster. Thus, tech-
nical advice for the cholera response was mainly deliv-
ered remotely.
WHO Yemen and the MoPHP implemented the IMS at 
the start of the second wave. This reflects WHO’s recent 
efforts to integrate the government and other partners 
into a unified command structure, outside of WHO’s 
internal structure.33 IMS aimed to ‘adopt a more oper-
ational posture by reducing the number of meetings 
and increasing the face-to-face working of the relevant 
stakeholders’ as compared with the ‘information sharing 
forum’ of the cluster system. However, this mandate was 
not clear to many respondents.
While 22 EOCs affiliated with one health RRT per 
district was planned, only eight EOCs were operational 
by April 2018.34 Drivers included insecurity and the lack 
of understanding across agencies, technical assistance for 
field implementation outside the capitals and standard 
guidance on IMS integration with the cluster system. 
Notwithstanding, the national EOCs in Sana’a and 
Aden achieved unified information management and 
response expertise in a single structure. Another positive 
consequence of the EOCs was for directing health RRTs, 
similar to those used in Haiti.35 Implemented during the 
second wave, health RRTs decentralised functions to the 
community level, including investigation, early response 
and quality control. In parallel, WASH RRTs investigated 
and provided household-based response within the first 
48 hours of detection when clusters of 5–20 suspected 
cases were detected.
Insecurity
The progressive degradation and destruction of civilian 
infrastructure required the humanitarian system to 
rethink how best to address the epidemic in a protracted 
and unpredictable conflict. Major stressors included the 
closure of ports and airports, blockades of imported food, 
fuel, medications and medical supplies, and artillery fire 
and restriction of movement, which threatened the local 
delivery of aid.36
Saudi-led coalition airstrikes damaged civilian infra-
structure including water desalination systems. This 
disrupted services, reduced water access to whole areas 
and potentially increased cholera transmission. The UN 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) provided a communication role with the 
Saudi-led coalition to avoid inadvertent strikes on the UN 
and its partners. Despite this, an airstrike hit a MSF-run 
DTC in Abs in June 2018.37 Between April 2015 and 
December 2017, 74 instances of airstrikes on water-re-
lated infrastructure including desalination systems and 
bottling plants in Taiz, Hodaydah, Hayz and Al Mukha 
and 70 instances of targeting of health facilities were 
documented (figure 1).10 The purposeful destruction 
of civilian water infrastructure is a violation of interna-
tional agreements including the Geneva Conventions. 
These airstrikes continued throughout the epidemic, 
despite repeated calls from UNICEF, MSF and others for 
the protection of these sites.37 38 Infrastructure damage 
is difficult and costly to repair under a humanitarian 
mandate.
Some of this damage may have been inadvertent and 
associated with military activity near these sites. However, 
the pattern of repeated strikes on infrastructure suggests 
purposeful targeting. The destruction of infrastructure 
is generally permitted if such facilities are deemed of 
military necessity. Nevertheless, such attacks would need 
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Figure 1 Locations of airstrikes targeting water infrastructure, April 2015–December 2017.14 Legend: 2015 (black), 2016 
(blue), 2017 (yellow) and 2018 (red).
to meet accepted criteria of proportionality, a principle 
that demands that combatants do not inflict damage 
to non-combatants in excess of the military advantage 
associated with an attack.39 Yet, this principle has been 
criticised as vague and inherently unable to protect 
infrastructure that is of dual use. Proportionality consid-
erations for dual use sites did not provide much protec-
tion in Yemen. The Saudi-led coalition’s Joint Incidents 
Assessment Team conducted poststrike investigations, 
though these did not address what actions to take to 
improve civilian protection.40
dIsCussIon
The response to large epidemics and the coordination 
of health services during crises are some of the most 
complex processes in public health.3 41 Given cholera 
epidemics in the region, water insecurity and the conflict-
driven degradation of health and WASH systems, the 
emergence of cholera in Yemen was likely unavoidable. 
Our analysis suggests that the poor operating environ-
ment and the late adoption of cholera-specific control 
measures, however, restricted the scope for prevention 
of the larger epidemic. Persistent gaps included bottle-
necks in surveillance and coordination and the lack of 
a geographically decentralised response. Key advances 
occurred late in the second wave, including the switch to 
a cholera-specific WASH strategy, expansion of the oper-
ational footprint using RRTs and adoption of preventa-
tive vaccination. Adequate funding from the World 
Bank underpinned the response in an environment 
where appeals for the larger crisis are historically under-
funded.25 26 These advances, and the reduction in the 
population susceptible to infection, coincided with the 
epidemic receding.
Our findings are subject to limitations. The study 
presents self-reports from respondents who may have 
emphasised the effectiveness of their own organisations’ 
activities to provide a socially desirable response. Never-
theless, there was considerable variation on numerous 
issues among respondents within and among different 
organisations. Due to the restricted humanitarian roster 
to enter Yemen, despite repeated attempts we were 
unable to visit to observe the operations in person. Our 
study focuses on the broad strategies employed by the 
response but not the strategies of individual NGOs that 
may differ. We interviewed a limited number of national 
actors, despite several attempts to speak with the MoPHP 
and national NGOs. To address these limitations, we 
conducted a high number of interviews to build up a crit-
ical understanding, we used qualitative and quantitative 
data to triangulate the findings and we conducted several 
rounds of validation with respondents from different 
organisations. From this analysis, we propose five lessons 
learnt about epidemic control in Yemen and other FCAS 
(table 1).
Armed conflict increases the likelihood of the emer-
gence of epidemics.4 During the crisis in 2015 and 2016, 
the degradation of water and sanitation infrastructure 
had given rise to the proliferation of mosquitos and hence 
cycles of large-scale malaria and dengue outbreaks.26 42 
Degraded WASH infrastructure has been cited as driving 
the cholera epidemic in Yemen in the dry and rainy 
seasons due to the reliance on unsafe water and contami-
nation of available water, respectively.7 43 While Yemen had 
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Table 1 Challenges during the cholera epidemic in Yemen, their impacts, and opportunities for FCAS
Sector and challenge Impacts in Yemen Opportunities for FCAS
1. Cholera preparedness and 
planning was lacking.
 ► Scenarios and strategies for the 
2016 cholera response plan were 
under-developed and prevented a 
comprehensive early response.
 ► OCV was not included in a 
preparedness plan resulting in less 
technical knowledge and differing 
expectations among MoPHP and 
partners and prolonged delays for use.
 ► Develop multisector preparedness and 
response plans for cholera.
 ► Introduce OCV, and its use cases for 
crises (eg, use of the polio vaccination 
network amd single-dose strategies), 
through preparedness planning.
 ► Donors should prioritise and finance 
preparedness planning in FCAS.
2. Epidemic detection and monitoring 
could not be scaled.
 ► eDEWS was not primed for data 
management, and the laboratory 
network was not capacitated for 
monitoring.
 ► Efforts concentrated on improving data 
management over surveillance.
 ► Epidemiological and laboratory data to 
guide response was lacking.
 ► Ensure that surveillance systems have 
effective early warning, alert, response 
as well as robust data management 
capacity.
 ► Preparedness plans should evaluate 
the capacity to expand laboratory 
and specimen transport given the 
degradation of infrastructure.
3. WASH and health cholera-
specific strategies did not have a 
decentralised, community-based and 
intersectoral response.
 ► The WASH strategy did not target 
cholera-specific activities until late in 
the second wave.
 ► The health strategy was centralised 
to health facilities, and ORCs were 
underused.
 ► The intersectoral WASH–health 
response to interrupt transmission was 
lacking until the late implementation of 
RRTs.
 ► WASH and health strategies require 
decentralisation and judicious targeting 
of transmission in hotspots.
 ► Cholera specialists should be prioritised 
for entry in country early on for risk 
assessment and strategy development.
 ► Technical bodies should provide 
cholera outbreak trainings and adapted 
guidelines for staff.
4. Coordination systems operated 
with limited success and 
complementarity.
 ► As cluster system was already 
operating, the mandate for IMS was 
unclear.
 ► Oversight of key areas for Yemen (eg, 
cohesive third-party monitoring) were 
missed.
 ► WHO, UNICEF and the cluster system 
should codevelop global guidance on 
IMS/cluster integration for epidemics in 
humanitarian crises.
 ► In insecure areas, coordination 
mechanisms should oversee a system 
for third-party monitoring.
5. Protection of health facilities and 
WASH infrastructure during conflict.
 ► Infrastructure repeatedly attacked.
 ► Reduced protection of civilians and 
partners.
 ► No specific UN agency was responsible 
for recording and reporting attacks on 
WASH infrastructure.
A specific UN agency (likely UNICEF) 
should be chosen and provide surveillance 
of these attacks and stronger advocacy 
to prevent direct harm (eg, killings) and 
indirect harm (eg, damage to WASH 
infrastructure) to civilians.
FCAS, fragile and conflict-affected states; IMS, incident management system; MoPHP, Ministry of Public Health and Population; OCV, oral 
cholera vaccination; ORCs, oral rehydration corners; RRT, rapid response team; WASH, water, sanitation and hygiene; eDEWS, electronic 
Disease Early Warning System.
not experienced a cholera outbreak since 2011, a genetic 
lineage with the 2015–2016 outbreaks in East Africa 
demonstrates the persistent risk of regional dissemina-
tion.44 Yemen’s 2016 Humanitarian Response Plan, the 
main planning instrument for system-wide response, did 
not mention cholera; this suggests that cholera was not 
considered a key risk despite large epidemics in Somalia 
and Iraq in 2015.22 45 FCAS at risk of cholera should prior-
itise multisector preparedness planning, such as the plans 
used in Iraq in 2002 to anticipate the Gulf War, annual 
plans in South Sudan and Unicef’s Regional Cholera 
Platform in Africa.46 47 The process can uncover gaps 
and promote a cohesive understanding of the response 
strategy among partners. OCV provides an example 
where the absence of planning and delays in consensus 
were not unique to Yemen and have affected other FCAS 
that did not integrate OCV into their cholera plans (eg, 
Haiti, Somalia and South Sudan).30 Plans should focus on 
the human resource, logistical and financial limitations 
posed by the conflict. They should include an epidemi-
ological risk assessment, a focus on operational gaps, 
defined roles for ministries and partners and the integra-
tion of epidemiological scenarios for the pre-emptive use 
of OCV for high-risk areas while outbreaks are relatively 
small. This finding concurs with that of a South Suda-
nese study that demonstrated that proactive planning for 
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the preventative use of OCV during the humanitarian 
crisis was necessary for the procurement of vaccine and 
implementation before the declaration of the outbreak 
in South Sudan in 2014.30 48 Similarly, cholera specialists 
called for early steps to obtain the vaccine in Yemen, justi-
fied by the risk of uncontrolled transmission.49
In FCAS, the decentralisation of epidemic response 
to inaccessible areas should be anticipated. By 2016, 
most of Yemen’s population was in need of humani-
tarian aid (80%), WASH (77%) and health services 
(57%), and large parts of the country were insecure or 
difficult to access.22 Therefore, an early priority should 
have included decentralising the treatment network (by 
placing ORCs and smaller treatment units in communi-
ties to increase access to care and to reduce mortality) 
and WASH (through rapid response to interrupt trans-
mission before an outbreak enlarges). Decentralisation 
of interventions to insecure areas remains extremely 
challenging, both practically and ethically, and requires 
partnership models that balance community linkages 
of national NGOs with a level of risk transfer that is 
acceptable to them, community health workers and 
Red Cross Societies.50 51 This should be accompanied 
by a commitment to risk assessment and capacity 
building for responders through remote monitoring 
and training.
Yemen’s response to the large-scale cholera epidemic 
in a widespread active conflict and extremely food and 
water insecure environment challenges the tools of global 
health security. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
procedures to designate a large-scale epidemic as an L3 
emergency could have triggered an intersectoral coor-
dination structure for the whole humanitarian system.52 
WHO had implemented its Emergency Response Frame-
work but made its IMS a cross-agency endeavour to 
provide a more direct approach for epidemic response 
in the middle of the second wave on top of the cluster 
system’s more collaborative approach.33 The placement 
of the IMS outside of WHO’s internal ERF structure was 
confusing to non-WHO agencies and the lack of efforts 
to harmonise the coordination systems hampered trust 
among agencies and affected the response. As large 
epidemics in humanitarian crises will continue, as is 
occurring now with the ongoing Ebola outbreak in the 
DRC, WHO should focus on developing operating proce-
dures for the implementation of IMS and the clusters 
in an open process that includes Unicef, OCHA, other 
UN and humanitarian agencies and the cluster system. 
Finally, given the existing requirement to report attacks 
against heath workers and health facilities to the UN 
General Assembly by WHO, a similar mechanism should 
be implemented for attacks on public infrastructure 
including water systems.53 A specific UN agency, we would 
suggest UNICEF, given their recent focus on threats to 
water and sanitation in crises, should advocate strongly 
against such attacks on public infrastructure by warring 
parties, justified in part by a public health and protection 
mandate to prevent epidemics.54
Yemen’s experience highlights four neglected areas 
of research. First, protocols are needed for improving 
the specificity of RDTs under field conditions and their 
systematic use for monitoring epidemics where labora-
tory capacity is low.55 Second, evidence for the optimal 
timing and effectiveness of the RRT model, for the effec-
tiveness of the individual health and WASH interven-
tions in the rapid reduction of secondary transmission 
and the composition of an integrated package of health 
and WASH interventions are needed.35 56–58 Third, proto-
cols for case management among pregnant women and 
severely malnourished children are urgent priorities to 
avoid excess mortality.29 Fourth, guidance for the decen-
tralisation of the response with remote monitoring of 
epidemics in FCAS according to different contexts are 
lacking.
ConCLusIon
The challenges in delivering health services in Yemen, 
Syria, South Sudan and other L3 emergencies are stag-
gering. Our study raises a broader concern over the 
chaos that this massive epidemic placed on a humani-
tarian system actively managing extreme food insecu-
rity, displacement, drought and civil war. At the time 
of writing (April 2019), MSF has reported a surge in 
suspected cholera cases from January to March 2019 in 
Western Yemen resulting in nearly 109 000 suspected 
cases (2000 suspected cases weekly), including 190 
deaths.59 However, there is room for some limited opti-
mism in Yemen and future situations where protracted 
conflict gravely impacts civilians. WHO, UNICEF and its 
partners have reported intensive work to optimise the 
latest response based on review of response efforts and 
impacts.60 The World Bank’s funding of the response has 
also opened a new door to disease control in FCAS.
Nevertheless, it is clear in a world where conflicts 
are prolonged and disagreements among permanent 
members of the UN Security Council do not allow for 
their resolution, large-scale epidemics will likely become 
more common and more severe. We urge governments, 
the UN and the humanitarian system to learn from these 
and other efforts in order to be better prepared to rapidly 
control future epidemics in conflict-affected countries.
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